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This study considers the efficiency of banking in Australia during the post-
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This study compares the efficiency of foreign-owned banks operating in Australia with Australian 
domestic banks after deregulation of the Australian banking system during the early and mid 1980s. 
The objective is to determine if foreign banks were more efficient than domestic banks during our 
estimation period of 1988 to 2001. Previous Australian studies have largely ignored foreign-owned 
banks when studying efficiency of the Australian banking system. To date only Sathye (2001) has 
compared foreign banks with domestic banks for a single year (1996), and suggested that foreign 
banks are less efficient than domestic banks in Australia. This study will consider a longer time period 
to determine if the results of this single study apply to the period immediately following deregulation 
as well as more recently. Further, Walker (1998) found no evidence of diseconomies of scale in the 
Australian banking system between 1978 and 1990, using a sample that excluded foreign-owned 
banks.  
This paper will employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist Indices to consider the 
efficiency of both foreign and domestic banks and the dynamics of efficiency changes in Australia 
post-deregulation. The Australian banking system is dominated by 4 large banks, as well as having a 
number of smaller domestic banks, which are mainly regional retail banks. Thus, the domestic banks 
in this study will be categorised as either Big Four or Other Domestic. This categorisation will aid in 
consideration of the impact of different operational types upon observed efficiency. Further, the paper 
will consider several different definitions of inputs and outputs to determine if these differences have 
any impact upon differences in measured efficiency.  This approach will have the benefit of 
considering the multiproduct nature of bank inputs and outputs. 
The DEA results show that foreign banks were, on average, more input efficient than the domestic 
banks, mainly due to superior scale efficiency, which is opposite to findings of other studies (Berger et 
al, 2000). We argue that these results tend to support the limited form of the global advantage 
hypothesis as proposed by Berger et al (2000). The major (Big Four) banks used size as a barrier to 
entry to the new entrants.  However, the major banks also displayed superior pure technical efficiency. 
The superior input efficiency of foreign banks did not necessarily result in higher profits, consistent 
with Claessens et al (2001), DeYoung and Nolle (1996) and Williams (2002). The Malmquist Index 
results indicate that bank efficiency increased post-deregulation, and that the diversity in types of 
banks operating in Australia was an important source of the dynamic in efficiency changes. As a result 
of this dynamic, the overall differences in efficiency changes between the bank categories have 
reduced. The recession of the early 1990s resulted in technological regress, as compared to the period 
immediately following deregulation, which saw high levels of technological innovation, consistent 
with Claessens et al (2001). We also conclude that the choice of inputs and outputs impacts upon the 
finding of relative efficiency, consistent with Berger et al (1993). 
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The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section will provide some background to the process 
of deregulation in Australia. The third section will provide an overview of previous studies that have 
considered efficiency of the Australian banking system, the efficiency of foreign banks and the 
efficiency effects of financial system deregulation. The fourth section will discuss the data and 
methodology employed, while the fifth section will discuss the results. The final section will provide 
conclusions and directions for further research. 
2. Deregulation in Australia. 
Prior to 1979 Australia had a highly regulated banking system, with the Reserve Bank of Australia 
determining the price of both deposits and loans. The regulations in Australia restricted banking 
system flexibility, but the quid pro quo was protection from new entry (Pauly, 1987). The regulatory 
structure generated high profits for the incumbent banks by international standards (Revell, 1980). The 
Australian Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1981), (otherwise known as the Campbell 
Committee), recommended that the financial system should be deregulated. 
The Campbell Committee considered the commissioned study by Swan and Harper (1982) to be 
persuasive. This study emphasised the economy-wide benefits that would result from deregulation 
increasing the efficiency of the banking system. Symptoms of inefficiencies resulting from the system 
of regulations in place included internal cross-subsidies and over-provision of branch networks (Swan 
and Harper, 1982).
1 For our purpose, the main consequence of deregulation was the access of foreign 
banks into Australia.
2 
As a defensive reaction to the threat of foreign bank entry, there were mergers among the major six 
domestic banks during the deregulation period (Stearn and Tress, 1983; Hall, 1987).
3 The Bank of 
NSW merged with the Commercial Bank of Australia to form Westpac, and the National Bank of 
Australasia merged with the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney to establish National Australia 
Bank (NAB), both in June 1981.  
Australia had an established history of restrictions upon foreign bank entry post World War Two.
4 
Further, there were restrictions upon foreign ownership of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
(Pauly, 1987). In September 1984 applications were accepted from foreign banks for full banking 
status and restrictions upon foreign ownership of NBFIs were lifted. In 1985 sixteen foreign banks 
were granted licences to operate in Australia as subsidiary banks, of these, fifteen eventually 
established operations.
5 It was originally anticipated that these sixteen licences would be the entire 
                                                   
1   For further detail on the arguments for deregulation in Australia, see also Perkins (1989) and Harper (1986). 
2   Other key aspects of deregulation included (i) the removal of qualitative and quantitative controls upon bank balance 
sheets, (ii) the floating of the Australian dollar in 1983, and (iii) the use of market-based operations for the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
3   Detailed timelines of financial deregulation in Australia are available in Lewis and Wallace (1997) and Carew (1998). 
4   Two foreign banks operated in Australia post World War Two as branches for historical reasons (Pauly, 1987). 
5   J.P Morgan did not take up its licence. The announcement of sixteen licences was in excess of industry expectations, 
which were in the range of six to eight. 4 
ration of such licences.
6 All of the foreign banks that elected to take up their licences were operating 
by May 1986. 
A survey by Davis and Lewis (1982) considered that foreign banks have three advantages relative to 
domestic competitors; (i) significant knowledge capital, (ii) ownership of new technology, and (iii) 
superior skill in funds allocation. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) considered that foreign bank 
entry would provide a competitive stimulus to the banking system (Davis and Lewis, 1982, p 539). 
Foreign banks were also considered to innately possess economies of scale and so were capable of 
immediately competing with the incumbent banks (RBA, 1994).
7 Foreign banks have an active 
preference for operations as branches rather than as subsidiaries (Davis and Lewis, 1982).
8 In 1992 
branch operations were permitted. However, some tax-related issues delayed conversion of 
subsidiaries to branches until 1994 (East, 1993). 
The entrance of foreign banks into Australia has been regarded as a failure. This is particularly due to 
their inability to reach the target they set themselves of a twenty percent market share within five years 
of entry (Metcalfe, 1985; Standing Committee of Finance and Public Administration, 1991). Other 
factors contributing to this perception include the lack of impact the foreign banks have made upon the 
retail market (Ackland and Harper, 1992), and the poor profits of some of the new entrants (Ferguson, 
1990). This poor performance has been attributed to the high entry barriers the foreign banks faced 
upon entry, (SCOFPA, 1991, p 151), with the foreign banks being considered the cannon fodder of 
deregulation (Ferguson, 1990, pp 4 - 5). It has been argued that the foreign banks were never likely to 
succeed, given the creation of four dominant banks by the mergers of 1981, and the increased 
spending of these four banks to increase these barriers to entry (Ferguson, 1990). The newly licensed 
banks operating in Australia,
9 including the foreign banks, have also been regarded as less efficient 
and productive than the existing banks (Hogan, 1991). 
3. Literature Review. 
There are three streams of literature that are relevant to this study, (i) those dealing with bank 
efficiency in Australia, (ii) those comparing foreign bank efficiency with domestic bank efficiency and 
(iii) those considering the impact of deregulation upon bank efficiency.  
                                                   
6   In 1992 this ration was removed and branch operations (subject to restrictions) were permitted. 
7   This view regarded the foreign bank’s Australian operations as a direct extension of their international operations. 
8   A subsidiary is an Australian incorporated bank which has foreign ownership of over 50% of the equity; the majority of 
foreign bank subsidiaries in Australia have 100% foreign ownership.  A foreign bank branch is not legally separate from 
its parent and as such has the full support of the parent’s capital base and carries the parent’s credit rating.  In Australia 
foreign bank branches are restricted to wholesale banking only. As foreign bank branches are not legally separate from 
the parent they do not report many of the variables necessary for this study. 
9   During the process of deregulation a number of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) converted to bank status, these 
were mainly building societies with a regional focus upon retail finance. One foreign-owned merchant bank (Hill Samuel 
Australia) listed on the Australian Stock Exchange as Macquarie Bank and became largely Australian-owned with a 
wholesale focus. 5 
Australian Studies. 
The Australian banking system has been subject to considerable changes, which brought with them 
expectations of improved efficiency; however, the literature to date has been relatively sparse. The 
Financial System Inquiry [FSI] (1997)
10 considered the impact of deregulation. The FSI considered 
that there were three types of efficiency gains due to deregulation. These efficiency gains were (i) 
allocative efficiency, (the allocation of resources to their highest value use); (ii) technical efficiency, 
(the maximisation of finance sector outputs given its inputs) and (iii) dynamic efficiency, (the extent 
of product innovation and the application of cost-minimising technology). Worthington (1999) 
provided some criticisms of the measures used by the FSI to assess these efficiency gains.  In 
particular, the FSI used simple ratios and anecdotal evidence to conclude efficiency gains. This 
approach considers finance firms as single-product rather than multi-product firms and does not fully 
capture the dynamics of efficiency changes, unlike the method employed in this paper. 
A survey by Berger and Humphrey (1997) did not identify one study of Australian bank efficiency.
11 
More recently, Walker (1998) applied a translog cost function to twelve Australian banks during the 
period 1978-1990. This study did not include any foreign banks in its sample and concluded that there 
was no evidence of diseconomies of scale and some evidence of constant returns to scale. Avkiran 
(1999) considered the efficiency effects of Australian bank mergers. This study considered 23 banks 
(no foreign banks
12) between 1986 and 1995. It was concluded that bank efficiency increased until 
1991 and then declined due to problems associated with bad debts. Avkiran (1999) concluded that 
acquiring banks are more efficient than target banks pre-merger, but that post-merger efficiency 
changes could not be conclusively discerned. Avkiran (2000) studied ten domestic Australian banks 
between 1986 and 1995, to determine the post-deregulation degree of changes in bank productivity. It 
was concluded that total productivity increased over the study period, but this increase was mainly due 
to technological progress rather than technical efficiency. Sathye (2002) applied Malmquist indices to 
17 Australian banks (1995 to 1999) and concluded that there had been a decline in efficiency over the 
study period, but did not consider foreign banks.
13 
Allen and Rai (1996) conducted a cross-border study of bank efficiency between 1988 and 1992 and 
concluded that Australia had a relatively efficient banking system. Worthington (1999) applied 
Malmquist indices to credit unions in Australia post-deregulation and concluded that there had been 
technological regress resulting in a 2.14% decline in total factor productivity over the study period. 
However, as credit unions are subject to operating conditions different to those faced by licensed 
banks, this does not necessarily indicate deregulation has resulted in a reduction in Australian financial 
system efficiency. To date, one Australian study has considered the efficiency of foreign as well as 
                                                   
10   Commonly known as the Wallis Report. 
11   A descriptive study was conducted by Oster and Antioch (1995), but this compared generic ratios of bank efficiency and 
did not conduct any frontier estimation. 
12   Avkiran (1999 and 2000) included a foreign-owned bank in both studies (The Bank of Scotland acquired 51% ownership 
of BankWest in 1995). Avkiran (1999) included a second foreign bank (National Mutual Royal Bank, a joint venture 
bank). The foreign ownership issue was not considered in either study. 
13   It should be noted that the discussion in Sathye (2002) on page 53 are somewhat inconsistent with the results presented in 
table 3 on page 54. 6 
domestic banks, Sathye (2001). Sathye (2001) studied 29 banks in 1996 (12 foreign, 17 domestic) and 
concluded that Australian banks are, on average, less efficient than world mean bank efficiency. 
Sathye (2001) also provided some evidence that foreign banks are less efficient than domestic banks, 
but did not consider the issue of economies of scale. 
International Studies of Foreign bank efficiency. 
The empirical evidence to date, as surveyed by Berger et al (2000), has found foreign-owned financial 
institutions to be less efficient than domestic institutions.
14 In the case of the United States, studies by 
Hasan and Hunter (1996), Mahajan, Rangan and Zardkoohi (1996), and Chang, Hasan and Hunter 
(1998) found foreign banks to be less cost efficient than domestic banks, while DeYoung and Nolle 
(1996) found foreign banks to have lower profit efficiency. A wider ranging study by Miller and 
Parkhe (2002) considered profit efficiency in fourteen different nations, and found domestic banks to 
be more efficient than foreign banks. Berger et al (2000) proposed two alternative hypotheses to 
explain these results. According to the home field advantage, the domestic institutions’ efficiency 
advantage is sourced in costs borne by the foreign institution. These costs include monitoring from a 
distance and staff turnover in overseas postings. Other problems faced by the foreign banks include 
diseconomies of operation in the retail sector, barriers to entry such as language, culture, market 
structure and regulations.
15 The global advantage hypothesis has two forms: the general form and the 
limited form. Under the general form, efficient foreign banks from a range of nations are able to offer 
superior efficiency compared to domestic banks, which has been rejected by the literature to date. 
Under the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis foreign banks from a particular set of 
nations are able to offer efficiency superior to the domestic banks. The limited global advantage 
hypothesis proposes that some efficient foreign banks are able to master the disadvantages presented 
by the liability of foreignness and operate at superior levels of efficiency compared to their domestic 
competition. This global advantage may be sourced in management skills, fund raising opportunities 
or the ownership of best-practice procedures. Berger et al (2000) argued that this nation-specific 
advantage could be sourced from factors such as home market structure and regulation. The local 
versus global advantage hypothesis was tested, and the limited global advantage hypothesis was 
supported. Berger et al (2000) considered both profit and cost efficiency and concluded that while on 
average domestic banks have higher cost and profit efficiency; disaggregation by nationality found 
that for three of the five nations studied, foreign banks from the United States were on average more 
efficient than domestic banks. It was argued that these results were due to actual advantages rather 
than transfer pricing (Berger et al, 2000, pp 59 – 60). 
International Studies of the Efficiency Effects of Deregulation. 
An important aspect of deregulation is its impact upon the efficiency of the financial system, as a key 
objective of deregulation is to improve efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In the case of the 
United States it has been generally found that deregulation has been followed by a decline in cost 
                                                   
14   See also Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
15   These costs are frequently labelled the liability of foreignness, see for example Zaheer (1995), Zaheer and Mosakowski 
(1997), Miller and Parkhe (2002). 7 
productivity, with this decline being attributed to depositors gaining from deregulation via higher 
deposit interest rates (Berger et al, 2000). A recent study by Mukherjee et al (2001) found that 
productivity declined immediately post-deregulation in the United States. Deregulation of the financial 
system has occurred in a number of nations. Studies of the impact of deregulation upon efficiency 
have found mixed results. Improvements in efficiency have been reported for Taiwan (Shyu, 1998), 
Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998), Norway (Berg et al, 1992), Turkey (Zaim, 1995) and Thailand 
(Leightner and Lovell, 1998). In the case of Spain (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996) deregulation was 
found to have a negative impact upon efficiency.  
Studies of the effects of deregulation upon different bank types within a nation have found that 
deregulation has different effects upon different bank types. In the Indian case, Bhattacharyya et al 
(1997) found that foreign banks experienced the greatest improvements in efficiency, while private 
banks had a smaller increase in efficiency and public bank efficiency declined. In the Greek case, 
Noulas (1997) found that technical efficiency increased for private banks but not for state banks, while 
there was technological progress for state banks but not for private banks. Berg et al (1992) found that 
Norwegian banks created idle capacity (excess inputs) pre-deregulation and that post-deregulation 
improvements in efficiency were mainly the result of the Norwegian banks catching up to efficient 
output levels.
16 Overall, the impact of deregulation seems to be determined by the nature of 
deregulation adopted and the structure of the financial system prior to deregulation. 
4. Method and Data. 
There are a number of alternative methods available to measure bank efficiency, with Berger et al 
(1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997) providing key surveys of the 
alternative methods.
17 This study will employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist 
Indices. DEA is a non-parametric linear programming method, which does not require input or output 
prices in order for a best practice production frontier to be identified. The best practice frontier is 
identified as a piece-wise linear composite of observed best practices, given the specification of inputs 
and outputs.
18 The outcome is to produce a convex production frontier for output oriented DEA, while 
input oriented DEA produces a concave production frontier (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
19 DEA 
generates a within-sample efficiency score between 0 and 1, with 1 being most efficient. Under the 
alternative assumptions of Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) it is 
possible to decompose the (Technical Efficiency) score into the components of Pure Technical 
Efficiency and Scale Efficiency.
20 It is also possible to determine if the individual bank is experiencing 
                                                   
16   This situation has some parallels to the Australian situation discussed in Section 2, where the major Australian banks 
merged amongst themselves and increased spending, (especially upon branch infrastructure), in order to increase the 
barriers to entry for the foreign banks (Ferguson, 1990). 
17   A valuable reference is also Coelli et al (1998). 
18   See, for example, Coelli et al (1998) Chapter 6. 
19   Berger and Humphrey (1997) identified over 60 studies that have applied DEA to the banking industry. 
20   Technical Efficiency = Scale Efficiency × Pure Technical Efficiency. 8 
Increasing, Constant or Decreasing Returns to Scale.
21 A separate production frontier will be estimated 
for each year of this study. 
The Malmquist Index approach is a chained index approach, which measures changes in efficiency 
relative to a base year.
22 Production frontiers for a base year and successive years are estimated and 
each firm’s movements in efficiency relative to these frontiers are estimated. The Malmquist Index 
approach measures efficiency changes with respect to a base year value of 1.  If the index for the year, 
other than the base year, is above 1, there has been an efficiency improvement. On the other hand, if 
the index value for the year is below 1 there has been efficiency regress. These changes in efficiency 
can be decomposed into components due to changes in technical efficiency (catching up) and 
movements due to changes in technology (technological change). Changes in a firm’s technical 
efficiency can be decomposed into change due to pure technical efficiency change and changes due to 
scale efficiency.
23  
This study will consider banks operating in Australia between 1988 and 2001. While foreign banks 
commenced operations in 1986, their annual reports for 1987 in many cases reflected results for a 
portion of the year. Thus comparing the foreign bank results with those for domestic banks, which 
reported for the entire financial year, would be inappropriate. The primary data source for this study is 
the banks annual reports. These were individually obtained from each bank.
24 Details regarding 
housing loans were obtained from the Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin and the earlier Australian 
Government Gazette. Sufficient data was available for thirty-six banks to be included in the sample. 
The banks are categorised as Big Four, Other Domestic and Foreign. The Big Four banks are the 
dominant banks in the Australian banking industry, with 67.8% of total bank assets in 1988 and 65.7% 
of total bank assets in 1998.
25 The Other Domestic banks consist primarily of regional banks with a 
retail focus, with the exception of Macquarie Bank, which focuses upon wholesale banking. The Other 
Domestic banks were mainly state-owned banks in the early years of the sample, with converted 
building societies increasing in importance in the later years of the sample period. There are a total of 
14 Other Domestic banks in this study. The foreign banks are all those banks with more than 50% 
foreign ownership, the majority of the foreign banks are wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign banks.
26 
Due to their status as wholly-owned subsidiaries, the annual reports produced by the foreign banks, in 
many cases, had a lower level of disclosure.
27 There are a total of 18 foreign banks in this study.
28 
                                                   
21   Interested readers are referred to Coelli et al (1998), Chapters 6 and 7 for further details. 
22   Relevant studies include Berg et al (1992) and Färe et al (1994). 
23   Effch: technical efficiency change.  Techch: technological change.  Pech: pure technical efficiency change. Sech: scale 
efficiency change.  Tfpch: total factor productivity change.  Effch = Pech * Sech.  Tfpch = Effch * Techch. 
24   Annual reports were not available from foreign bank branches and so they are excluded from this study. 
25   Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, various issues. 
26   Of the foreign banks in this study, BankWest, Bank of America, Bank of Singapore, Chase AMP, National Mutual Royal 
operated as joint venture banks with majority foreign ownership. With the exception of BankWest, these joint ventures 
were relatively short lived, with the banks either exiting (National Mutual Royal) or converting to 100% foreign 
ownership. 
27   These banks are not listed on the stock exchange and so are subject to less onerous disclosure requirements. 
28   This is more than the 15 foreign banks mentioned in the second section. As a bank was restructured it was counted as a 
new bank. This applied in three cases; (i) Chase AMP dissolved its joint venture and re-established Australian operations 
as Chase Manhattan; (ii) Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank merged their operations at home, and as a result Bank of 9 
Restrictions resulting from data availability dictated the research method chosen. Mergers, changes of 
ownership and data availability meant that some banks were not included in every year of the sample 
period.
29 The impact of mergers amongst the banks as well as conversion by foreign banks to branch 
status resulted in a decline in the sample size for each year across the sample period. 
In order to employ DEA and Malmquist Indices inputs and outputs must be specified. This study will 
employ the intermediation approach in which banks are viewed as financial intermediaries employing 
inputs such as labour, capital and deposits to produce outputs such as loans and off-balance sheet 
items.
30 Four alternative specifications of inputs and outputs are employed in this study. The most 
parsimonious model (Model 1) has inputs as (i) employee numbers, (ii) deposits and borrowed funds 
and (iii) equity capital. Outputs are (i) loans advances and other receivables and (ii) off-balance sheet 
activity measured as commitments and contingent liabilities.
31 Model 1a decomposes outputs in Model 
1 by dividing loans into two categories, (i) loans advances and other receivables less housing loans, 
and (ii) housing loans. This approach has the advantage of acknowledging that some banks have a 
greater focus upon retail activity (with a different cost structure), but brings with it a disadvantage that 
housing loans are not available for all banks for the entire study period.
32 Model 1b is identical to 
Model 1, but includes investments (liquid assets, trading securities, bill acceptances and other 
investments) as an additional output. Model 1b acknowledges the impact of an increased wholesale 
activity. Model 2 provides a mechanism to compare the results of this study with the previous studies 
by Avkiran (1999 and 2000), that excluded foreign banks. In Model 2, inputs are (i) interest expenses, 
and (ii) non-interest expenses, while outputs are (i) net interest income and, (ii) non-interest income. 
These measures of inputs and outputs are revenue focussed, and as efficiency estimates are sensitive to 
specification of inputs and outputs, (Berger et al, 1993), it is expected that this revenue focussed 
model will yield some differences.  
Table 1 details the characteristics of the sample used in Model 1 for DEA estimation, which had the 
largest sample size.
33 The sample composition for the Malmquist Index estimation is detailed in Table 
2. Given the available data, the maximum sample size for each Malmquist Index Model was selected, 
resulting in different sample sizes, with Models 1 and 1b having the largest sample, 15 banks over six 
years; and Model 2 having the smallest sample, 13 banks over six years. It is worth noting that the 
Malmquist Index approach is a chained index approach and as such the first year is used as a reference 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Tokyo/Mitsubishi Australia was formed; (iii) the regional domestic R&I Bank was sold to Bank of Scotland and 
restructured as BankWest. In each of these cases the restructured bank was treated as a new bank. 
29   In each case of a re-structure the new entity was treated as a new bank, as discussed above. As a separate production 
frontier was estimated for each year, this process does not create any bias. 
30   There is some controversy regarding the specification of inputs and outputs in banking, see for example Berger and 
Humphrey (1992). Favero and Papi (1995) found that their results were not sensitive to respecifying deposits as an output 
rather than as an input. 
31  This definition of off-balance sheet activity excludes market-related activity such as derivatives due to lack of data 
availability for the entire sample period. Off balance sheet items are measured as face value, as risk weighted values were 
not reported for the entire sample period. 
32   This problem particularly relates to the early part of the study period when housing loans were reported in the Australian 
Government Gazette. In the case of trading banks (pre 1989) housing loans were not reported. In most cases foreign 
banks operated in Australia as a trading bank, the distinction between trading banks and savings banks was removed 
during the deregulation process. 
33   Sample details relating to Models 1a, 1b and 2 are in the Appendix of this paper as Tables A1 to A3 respectively. 10 
year. Thus the results for the Malmquist Index analysis will exclude results for the first year of each 
sample. 
Table 1. 
Sample Characteristics of Model 1: DEA. 
 
Year Big4 Other 
Domestic 
Foreign Total 
1988 2  3  13  18 
1989 3  8  15  26 
1990 3  7  13  23 
1991 4  9  13  26 
1992 4  9  12  25 
1993 4  9  11  24 
1994 4  10  11  25 
1995  4 10 9 23 
1996  4 10 6 20 
1997  4 7 6  17 
1998  4 5 4  13 
1999  4 5 4  13 
2000  4 4 2  10 
2001  4 5 1  10 
 




Malmquist Index Sample Characteristics. 
 
Model  Big 4  Other  
Domestic 
Foreign Total   
Banks 
Years Total   
Observations 
Model 1  3  5  7  15  1989 to 1995  105 
Model 1a  3  6  7  16  1990 to 1995  96 
Model 1b  3  5  7  15  1989 to 1995  105 
Model 2  4  6  3  13  1989 to 1995  91 
 
Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items. 
Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans less housing loans, (ii) 
housing loans (iii) off balance sheet items. 
Model 1b Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off 
balance sheet items. 
Model 2: Inputs: (i) interest expenses, (ii) non-interest expenses.  Outputs: (i) net interest income, (ii) non-
interest income. 
 
The maximum sample size was selected for each model. 
 11 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample used. All values except employee numbers are 
in thousands of Australian dollars.  Panel A of Table 3 shows the overall descriptive statistics, while 
Panels B, C and D, show respectively the segmented descriptive statistics for the Big Four, Other 
Domestic and Foreign banks. The Other Domestic banks tend to have higher levels of housing loans, 
while the Foreign banks tend to have higher levels of off-balance sheet activity and non-interest 
income, while unsurprisingly, the Big Four banks are the largest. 
Table 3. 
Descriptive Statistics: Entire Sample: 1988 to 2001 
$A 000s, except employees. 
 
Panel A: All Banks 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Deposits   274  17,126,535.08  31,253,061.67  95,779.00  185,097,000.00 
Employees 255  8,528.18  15,013.89  45.00  50,367.00 
Equity capital  274  1,871,828.74  3,440,163.65  25,234.00  21,407,000.00 
Housing loans  261  4,610,771.29  7,795,707.82  0  34,155,000.00 
Interest expense  273  1,316,116.87  2,228,427.77  6,151.00  11,146,000.00 
Investments 274  3,655,175.87  5,944,115.20  2,701.00  32,614,000.00 
Loans 274  17,576,890.57  32,399,683.17  300,490.00  195,492,000.00 
Non interest income  264  497,183.29  923,551.05  1,686.00  6,523,000.00 
Non interest expense  238  876,810.12  1,407,196.58  8,431.00  7,229,000.00 
Net interest income  273  724,001.63  1,329,037.16  -856.00  6,371,000.00 
Off balance sheet 
activity 
262 774,202.81  16,401,153.85  0.00  93,611,000.00 
 
Panel B: Big Four Banks 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Deposits    48  77,896,052.08 30,563,418.44 33,036,300.00  185,097,000.00 
Employees 48  38,943.06  6,318.81  23,134.00  50,367.00 
Equity capital  48  8,428,083.33  3,658,608.87  3,766,100.00  21,407,000.00 
Housing loans  48  18,262,241.25  8340088.53  5053000.00  34155000.00 
Interest expense  48  5,758,618.75  1847994.75  3103400.00  11146000.00 
Investments 48  14,452,445.83  5,253,018.62  7,705,100.00  32,614,000.00 
Loans  48  79,860,500.00 33,476,104.11 35,339,800.00  195,492,000.00 
Non interest income  48  2,056,968.75  950,570.09  813,000.00  6,523,000.00 
Non interest expense  48  3,416,660.42  933,116.91  2,061,200.00  7,229,000.00 
Net interest income  48  3,435,612.50  954,508.62  2,072,100.00  6,371,000.00 
Off balance sheet 
activity 
46 39,364,732.61  17,623,005.26  5,510,000.00  93,611.000.00 
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Panel C: Other Domestic Banks. 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Deposits   115  6,727,316.49  7,232,348.04  540,753.00  37,853,919.00 
Employees 100  2,360.45  2,137.28  530.00  11,253.00 
Equity capital  115  667,640.06  835,025.08  62,388.00  3,859,000.00 
Housing loans  105  2,682,914.35  3,322,930.44  7,000.00  18,199,000.00 
Interest expense  115  515,467.42  525,111.54  6,151.00  2,145,500.00 
Investments 115  1,888,121.76  3,492,263.96  54,485.00  29,247,000.00 
Loans 115  6,516,643.14  7,479,304.29  485,509.00  39,454,000.00 
Non interest income  115  221,516.38  565,354.27  1,686.00  4,332,000.00 
Non interest expense  114  321,169.96  574,754.92  22,323.00  4,261,000.00 
Net interest income  115  222,917.22  249575.88  13119.00  1172000.00 
Off balance sheet 
activity 
106 1,349,120.02  1,777,397.44 0.00 8,320,000.00 
 
Panel D: Foreign Banks. 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Deposits   111  1,621,790.23  1,920,254.21  95,779.00  10,029,900.00 
Employees 107  648.35  825.43  45.00  2,997.00 
Equity capital  111  284,274.48  337,204.36  25,234.00  1,576,769.00 
Housing loans  108  417,756.67  1,180,123.85  0.00  6,441,200.00 
Interest expense  110  214,613.20  198,050.22  21,495.00  942,920.00 
Investments 111  816,817.88  996,728.55  2,701.00  5,051,666.00 
Loans 111  2,102,252.76  2,484,295.35  300,490.00  14,256,200.00 
Non interest income  101  69,777.28  120,381.35  2,122.00  580,546.00 
Non interest expense  76  106,154.38  120,140.24  8,431.00  568,218.00 
Net interest income  110  64,614.22  90,084.32  -856.00  369,000.00 
Off balance sheet 
activity 




The DEA and Malmquist Index estimation used in this study is input oriented, which addresses the 
issue of reducing input quantities proportionally while keeping output quantities unchanged. 
Summaries of the results of the input-oriented DEA efficiency scores for Model 1 for each year in the 
sample period are shown in Table 4, while Figure 1 graphs the summaries drawn from Table 4.
34 
Average Technical Efficiency ranges from 0.73 (1991) to 0.94 (2000). These values are higher than 
those found by Sathye (2001), who estimated an overall efficiency score of 0.58 for 1996. However, 
Avkiran (1999) found annual mean efficiency scores of between 0.80 (1991) to 0.91 (1986). As stated 
by Berger et al (1993), results of efficiency estimations are sensitive to the specification of inputs and 
outputs, even when the same method of estimation is applied. Thus care should be taken when 
comparing efficiency scores drawn from different samples (even if the same estimation method has 
been used). Sathye (2001) used labour, the price of labour, capital, the price of capital, loanable funds 
                                                   
34   Summaries of the DEA efficiency scores for Models 1a, 1b and 2 are in the Appendix of this paper as Tables A4 to A6 
respectively. 13 
and the price of loanable funds as inputs, while using demand deposits and loans as outputs.
35 This is a 
different specification to that applied in this study, which is the likely source of differences between 
the two sets of results. Berger and Humphrey (1997) found world mean efficiency of 0.86, which is 
similar to the range of values found in all models in this study. Further, Allen and Rai (1996) 
conducted a cross-nation study of bank efficiency and found Australian bank efficiency of similar 
magnitude to that found in this study.
36 With average input efficiency in this study of around 80%, this 
indicates that the Australian banking system could reduce inputs by approximately 25% without 
changing output levels. 
Table 4. 
Average DEA Efficiency Scores: Model 1 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Year         Year      
1988 TE  PTE  Scale    1989 TE PTE  Scale 
















































            
1990 TE  PTE  Scale    1991 TE  PTE  Scale 
















































            
1992 TE  PTE  Scale    1993 TE  PTE  Scale 
















































            
                                                   
35   By using the price of inputs as well as their quantities, Sathye (2001) was able to measure allocative efficiency. Due to 
data availability, this was not possible for the much larger sample used in this study. 
36   Allen and Rai (1996) reported average bank inefficiency scores for Australia of 0.134, implying bank efficiency scores of 
0.866. 14 
1994 TE  PTE  Scale    1995 TE  PTE  Scale 
















































           
1996 TE  PTE  Scale    1997 TE  PTE  Scale 
















































            
1998 TE  PTE  Scale    1999 TE  PTE  Scale 
















































           
2000 TE  PTE  Scale    2001 TE  PTE  Scale 

















































Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items.  
TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale: Scale Efficiency.  ODOM: Other Domestic.  
Values in bold are the largest for that category in that year.  * Indicates maximum value of 1 for that category. 
Scale Efficiency is calculated as decreasing return to scale; scale efficiency score unchanged; constant returns to 
scale score unchanged; increasing returns to scale, score transformed to (2- original score).  Thus, an average 
scale efficiency score above 1 indicates increasing returns to scale on average, below one indicates decreasing 
returns to scale on average and a score of one indicates constant returns to scale on average. 
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Pure Technical Efficiency 
 
Scale Efficiency 
Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items.  
TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale: Scale Efficiency.  ODOM: Other Domestic.  
Scale Efficiency is calculated as decreasing return to scale; scale efficiency score unchanged; constant returns to 
scale score unchanged; increasing returns to scale, score transformed to (2- original score).  Thus, an average 
scale efficiency score above 1 indicates increasing returns to scale on average, below one indicates decreasing 
























































Examination of Table 4 indicates the main source of technical inefficiency is scale inefficiency, with 
scale efficiency ranging between 0.84 (1994) and 0.99 (2001). This is in contrast to the results of Allen 
and Rai (1996) who found – in a global context – that input X-inefficiencies, such as technical 
inefficiencies, dominated output inefficiencies, such as economies of scope, when determining overall 
efficiency. Closer examination of these results shows that the Big Four banks have consistently lower 
scale efficiency. However, the Big Four banks also have consistently higher pure technical efficiency. 
Thus, the Big Four banks are operating at a scale size in excess of that for optimum technical 
efficiency. This result supports the arguments of Stearn and Hall (1983) and Hall (1987), that the 
mergers amongst the major banks during the deregulation period were defensive reactions to foreign 
bank entry, with the major banks seeking to use size as a barrier to entry to the new entrants. Further, 
Ferguson (1990) argued that the four major banks increased spending on branch infrastructure with the 
same aim. It can be seen from this study that the impact of this strategy was to expand the major banks 
to a size beyond that needed for efficient operation.  This can be seen most strongly when considering 
the results for Model 1a, both the DEA and Malmquist results do not find the Big Four banks to be the 
most efficient on average, with the sole exception of 1999 (DEA). This would indicate that the use of 
size as a barrier to entry was most reflected in the branch networks employed in retail banking. It is 
interesting to note that in the later years of this study, one of the Big Four banks (ANZ) has adjusted 
its size to that of constant returns to scale (or most efficient scale size), for all DEA models.
37 As 
discussed below, the Malmquist Index results find that the Big Four banks tended to improve their 
scale efficiency toward the end of the sample period, thus the scale inefficiencies of the immediate 
post-deregulation period are now declining. Table 5 summarises the scale efficiency for each year of 
the study from the DEA estimation.
38 
Table 5. 
DEA Scale Efficiency: Model 1. 
 
Year         Year      
1988 DRS  IRS  CRS    1989 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  9 5 4    All  13 7 6 
Big 4  2 0 0    Big 4  3 0 0 
ODOM  0 2 1    ODOM  4 3 1 
Foreign  7 3 3    Foreign  6 4 5 
            
1990 DRS  IRS  CRS    1991 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  9 6 8    All  11 7 8 
Big 4  3 0 0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  3 2 2    ODOM  5 2 2 
Foreign  3 4 6    Foreign  2 5 6 
               
                                                   
37   Sathye (2002) also found ANZ to show consistently high efficiency. 
38   Scale efficiency for Models 1a, 1b and 2 are in the Appendix as Tables A7 to A9 respectively. 17 
1992 DRS  IRS  CRS    1993 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  13 6  6    All  12 5 7 
Big 4  4 0 0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  7 1 1    ODOM  6 1 2 
Foreign  2 5 5    Foreign  2 4 5 
            
1994 DRS  IRS  CRS    1995 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  18 1  6    All  16 1 6 
Big 4  4 0 0    Big 4  3 0 1 
ODOM  9 0 1    ODOM  10 0 0 
Foreign  5 1 5    Foreign  3 1 5 
           
1996 DRS  IRS  CRS    1997 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  11 5  4    All  8 5 4 
Big 4  4 0 0    Big 4  3 0 1 
ODOM  5 4 1    ODOM  3 4 0 
Foreign  2 1 3    Foreign  2 1 3 
            
1998 DRS  IRS  CRS    1999 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  5 5 3    All  6 3 4 
Big 4  3 0 1    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  2 3 0    ODOM  2 2 1 
Foreign  0 2 2    Foreign  0 1 3 
            
2000 DRS  IRS  CRS    2001 DRS  IRS  CRS 
All  5 0 5    All  4 1 5 
Big 4  3 0 1    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  2 0 2    ODOM  2 1 2 
Foreign  0 0 2    Foreign  0 0 1 
            
DRS: Decreasing Returns to Scale; IRS: Increasing Returns to Scale; CRS: Constant Returns to Scale. 
Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items. 
ODOM: Other Domestic.   
 
Considering the DEA results of Tables 4 and 5 in conjunction, the foreign banks generally display 
superior technical efficiency due to superior scale efficiency. This superior scale efficiency confirms 
the argument of the Reserve Bank of Australia (1994) that the foreign banks innately possess 
economies of scale and so were able to offer an immediate competitive stimulus to the Australian 
banking system. As Table 4 shows, in their first full year of operations, the foreign banks were, on 
a v e r a g e ,  m o r e  e f f ic ie n t  t h a n  t h e  B i g  F o u r  b a n k s .   H o w e v e r ,  g iv e n  t h e  s a m p l e  s i z e  a n d  s t a n d a r d  
deviations, these differences are not significant. In the fourteen years considered by this study the 
foreign banks displayed superior average technical efficiency in eleven years. This outcome stands 
somewhat in contrast to the results surveyed by Berger et al (2000), which indicated that foreign banks 
are on average less efficient than domestic banks. The solution to this difference may be found in the 
limited form of the global advantage hypothesis proposed by Berger et al (2000), which argues that 
multinational banks from a subset of nations are able to operate in the host nation at superior 
efficiency. 18 
As shown in Table 1, the number of foreign banks considered in this study is relatively small, thus 
statistical testing of nation effects is not possible. The process by which these nations were selected is 
difficult to determine as it occurred during a closed session of the Federal Cabinet. However, this 
process did have a bias toward large established multinational banks from Australia’s major trading 
partners (Pauly, 1987). It is possible that this bias has selected those banks that possess advantages that 
reflect some aspect of the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis.
39 
Consistent with the findings of Avkiran (1999), the DEA study finds that 1991 was the year of lowest 
average efficiency for most models. In 1991 increased provisions for bad debts were experienced by 
the Australian banking system. It is worthwhile noting that Model 1a, which has a retail focus, does 
not show 1991 to be the year of lowest average efficiency, indicating that those banks with a retail 
focus were able to reduce the negative impact of the losses of the early 1990s. It is also worth noting 
that Model 2, which has a revenue focus, shows 1993 as the year of lowest efficiency, indicating there 
are some delays in these losses being reflected in the revenue measures used.
40 
The Malmquist Index results found that the post-deregulation period studied was generally one of 
overall efficiency improvement, with Model 1 finding productivity improvements of 10% over the 
sample period. Model 1b with a wholesale focus, found similar efficiency improvements. This 
outcome is weakly consistent with the arguments of Milbourne and Cumberworth (1991) who argued 
that the competitive impact of foreign bank entry in Australia was particularly apparent in the 
wholesale markets. It can be seen from Table 6 that the rate of technological change was lower in the 
retail focussed model (Model 1a), as compared to Models 1 and 1b. Model 1a found somewhat lower 
average improvements in efficiency, at 8%, due to lower technological change. However, as shown in 
Table 2, the sample period for Model 1a differs from that of Models 1 and 1b. A notable result for the 
Malmquist Index Model 1a was a finding of very high technological change in 1992, particularly for 
the foreign banks (index value of 2.41 for foreign banks), this was followed by a large technological 
regress in 1994 for foreign banks (index value of 0.57).  This rapid shift is possibly the result of the 
recession of the early 1990s impacting upon the pace of innovation.
41 It is also highly likely that some 
of the foreign banks were adjusting their operations after 1993 to reflect the process of conversion to 
branch status, causing a shift in the input-output mix employed by the foreign subsidiary banks and a 
resulting reduction in observed efficiency. 
In contrast, Model 2 concluded that there was productivity regress of 3% over the sample period, 
while Avkiran (2000) found productivity improvement of 3.5%. While Avkiran (2000) specified the 
same inputs and outputs, fewer banks and a different sample period were used, which most likely 
accounts for the differences in results. The inclusion of foreign banks in this study, as opposed to 
Avkiran (2000) is the most likely source of this difference, with the foreign banks in Australia most 
impacted by the recession of the early 1990s in terms of profit reductions (Ferguson, 1990; Williams, 
                                                   
39   Suggestive of this conclusion is that IBJ and Mitsubishi Bank (later Bank of Tokyo/Mitsubishi) are consistently found to 
have technical efficiency of 1 in each of Models 1, 1a, and 1b. Given the small number of foreign banks in the study, a 
statistical test of the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis is not possible. 
40   As the revenue measures employed excluded an asset quality measure. 
41   This large cyclical effect also explains the large standard deviations seen in Model 1a in Table 6.  It should be noted that 
the economic cycle effects of the early 1990s were not isolated to Australia. 19 
2002). Model 1 and its variations confirm Avkiran’s (2000) result of productivity improvements being 
mainly sourced in technological progress. However, Model 2 in this study, as based upon Avkiran 
(2000), found technological regress and any small productivity improvements being sourced in scale 
efficiency changes, mainly for the Other Domestic banks. Table 6 has the summary of the Malmquist 
index means for all models. The Malmquist Indices for Model 1, Model 1a and Model 1b show 
foreign bank efficiency improving over the sample period, mainly due to technological change. 
However, Model 2 finds efficiency regress for the foreign banks over the sample period. This confirms 
that Model 2 measures different aspects of efficiency as compared to the other Models, as will be 
discussed below. It is worth noting that Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) argue that balance sheet 
measures are a more reliable measure of multinational bank activity than income items, in contrast to 
Berger et al (2000) who did not consider that observed differences in foreign bank efficiency were due 
to transfer pricing. 
Table 6. 












































































































Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans less housing loans, (ii) 






















































Model 1b Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off 






















































Model 2: Inputs: (i) interest expenses, (ii) non-interest expenses.  Outputs: (i) net interest income, (ii) non-
interest income. 
Values in bold are the largest for that category. 
Effch: technical efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale technology.  Techch: technological 
change.  Pech: pure technical efficiency change relative to variable returns to scale technology.  Sech: scale 
efficiency change.  Tfpch: total factor productivity change.  Effch = Pech * Sech.  Tfpch = Effch * Techch. 
 
(There are some small differences due to rounding.) 
 
Model 2 is the revenue-focussed model and the Malmquist Indices indicate that improvement in 
efficiency found in the Models 1, 1a and 1b did not necessarily translate into improvements in 
observed profitability. This difference is most likely due to the impact of the economic recession of 
1991 and 1992 upon the profits of banks in this study, as previously discussed. This point is borne out 
by considering a diagram of the annual Malmquist index results on a year-by-year basis. The yearly 
Malmquist index scores for Model 1 for each of technical efficiency change, technological change, 
pure technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change and total factor productivity change are 
graphed in Figure 2.
42 The graph shows that the early 1990s saw a distinct shift in efficiency changes, 
particularly for technological change, with the later period of the sample showing efficiency regress 
                                                   
42   Tables A10, A11, A12 and A13 have the year by year Malmquist index scores for, respectively, Model 1, Model 1a, 
Model 1b and Model 2. 21 
due mainly to technological regress. The period immediately after deregulation saw rapid 
technological innovation resulting from the competitive shock, consistent with Claessens et al (2001).  
It was argued by Claessens et al (2001) that the competitive impact of foreign bank entry is felt 
immediately after entry, with the incumbent banks competing aggressively with the new entrants. The 
results of this study support this conclusion. The exogenous shocks of the recession of the early 1990s 
reversed many of these early benefits and slowed the pace of efficiency change (this was particularly 
apparent for the Malmquist Index results for foreign banks in Model 1a). However, the post-recession 
period also saw some small increases in scale efficiency changes. This period also saw a period of 
consolidation of the banking system in Australian brought on by both in-market mergers
43 and some 
mergers of foreign bank parents.
44 
Figure 2. 




                                                   
43   See Avkiran (1999). 
44   It is possible that these mergers (both in market and of foreign bank parents) resulted in the post-recession improvements 
in scale efficiency, but sample size limitations prevent a conclusive test. Avkiran (1999) was likewise unable to 



























Pure Technical Efficiency Change 
 
Scale Efficiency Change 
 
Total Factor Productivity Change 
 
Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items. 
Effch: technical efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale technology.  Techch: technological 
change.  Pech: pure technical efficiency change relative to variable returns to scale technology.  Sech: scale 


































Overall, the Malmquist Index results do not show any one category of bank type as being conclusively 
more efficient. The Foreign banks are the most efficient in Models 1a and 1b, while Models 1 and 2 
favour the Big Four banks. However, given the sample sizes and standard deviations, this cannot be 
considered conclusive. Study of the year by year results for the Malmquist indices found that as one 
category innovated to move the efficient frontier outward, the other categories reacted by innovating 
themselves and so moving the efficient frontier outward in following year. This explains why the 
averages are relatively close across the three bank categories across the sample periods, with the 
exception of Model 1a. As an example of this process, in 1991 the Foreign banks showed the largest 
efficiency improvements, while in 1992 it was the Other Domestic banks, in 1993 it was the Foreign 
banks, and in 1994 it was the Big Four banks (Model 1). As a result no one bank category alone 
dominated the Malmquist Index scores as being the source of efficiency improvements. This indicates 
the need for diversity in the types of banks operating in Australia in order to provide the competitive 
pressure to innovate and provide efficiency improvements.  
Further, the results indicate the importance of negative external shocks, such as the recession of the 
early 1990s, in slowing down this process of innovation. It is also possible that the consolidation of the 
banking system that occurred in the mid to late 1990s contributed to this slowdown in efficiency 
changes. However, these mergers may have also resulted in a shift of emphasis from technological 
change to scale efficiency, but this result is somewhat less conclusive. As discussed below, over the 
study period a number of foreign banks converted to branch status, for which no data was available, 
and this lack of data may also act as a partial explanation of these results. 
Over the sample period, the number of foreign subsidiary banks in the DEA sample declined. This was 
due to several factors. Firstly, there were mergers amongst the parent banks, with for example, Bank 
of Tokyo and Mitsubishi merging. The second factor was the restructure of Australian operations. As 
indicated in Section 2, in 1992 branch operations by foreign banks was permitted. As discussed by 
Davis and Lewis (1982) foreign banks prefer to operate in the host market as a branch, thus after some 
tax related issues were resolved (East, 1993), five foreign banks converted to branch status only.
45 
This factor is a likely explanation for the technological regress observed for Foreign banks in Model 
1a in 1994. Given the difficulties mentioned above of comparing across separate DEA estimations, it 
is likely that those foreign banks that have made a strategic choice to operate in Australia as subsidiary 
banks rather than branches are those that are more efficient. While it is possible that the decline in 
sample size could also explain this effect, it is notable that the foreign banks consistently exhibit the 
best practice efficiency in the last two years of the sample, with the exception of Model 2. This would 
tend to support the limited version of the global advantage hypothesis proposed by Berger et al (2000). 
This is again an area that would benefit from further research. 
As compared to the DEA results, the Malmquist results find little evidence of superior scale efficiency 
by the foreign banks, with overall scale efficiency changes for the period being close to 1. 
Examination of Figure 2 finds a rapid improvement in scale efficiency in the early 1990s, followed by 
a rapid reduction, probably caused by the negative efficiency impact of the recession of the early 
1990s. Following the recovery from this recession both of the domestic bank categories experienced 
                                                   
45   Some foreign banks operate in Australia as both subsidiary banks and branches. 24 
improvements in their scale efficiency, although the Big Four banks also experienced reduction in 
scale efficiency changes in the last sample year. This indicates that the shock of the recession of the 
early 1990s possibly produced a positive outcome of increased scale efficiency, although, as discussed 
above, the post-recession mergers are also possibly relevant, so this is not entirely conclusive. 
Combining this result with those from the DEA estimation, it can be concluded that the foreign banks 
provided an important source of technological efficiency changes immediately post-deregulation, and 
after the shock of the recession of the early 1990s the domestic banks somewhat improved their scale 
of operations. 
Of the four DEA models of bank efficiency presented in this paper, Models 1, 1a and 1b are relatively 
highly correlated, with the exception of Model 1a in 1988, and Model 1b in 1998. The low correlation 
for Model 1a in 1988 is due to sample availability issues. For the early period of this study the housing 
loans data needed for Model 1a was drawn from the Australian Government Gazette, which did not 
disclose housing loan data for trading banks, resulting in a smaller sample for this year. Model 2 has 
low or negative correlations with the other models except for 2001. This change (for 2001 only) is also 
most likely due to the impact of a reduction in sample size. Table 7 has correlation matrices for 1988, 
1993, 1998, and 2001.  
Table 7. 





  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model  1  1.0000     
Model 1a  0.3560  1.0000     
Model  1b  0.7575 0.5128 1.0000   
Model 2  -0.6111  -0.1654  -0.8418  1.0000 
 
Pure Technical Efficiency / Scale Efficiency 
 
  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000  0.5110 0.9103 0.2485 
Model 1a  0.0000  1.0000  0.5736 0.5349 
Model  1b  0.7104 0.0000 1.0000 0.2886 





  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000       
Model 1a  0.8382  1.0000     
Model 1b  0.8212  0.5771  1.0000   
Model  2  -0.3763 -0.4857 -0.1260 1.0000 
 
Pure Technical Efficiency / Scale Efficiency 
 
  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000  0.8365 0.9439 0.6853 
Model 1a  0.9533  1.0000  0.7569 0.4789 
Model 1b  0.7779  0.7683  1.0000  0.6931 





  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000       
Model 1a  0.9068  1.0000     
Model 1b  0.4329  0.3169  1.0000   
Model  2  -0.4304 -0.3372 -0.5149 1.0000 
 
Pure Technical Efficiency / Scale Efficiency  
 
  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000  0.8091 0.9335 0.4423 
Model 1a  1.0000  1.0000  0.8114 0.3645 
Model 1b  -0.0451  -0.0443  1.0000  0.3689 





  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000       
Model 1a  0.8188  1.0000     
Model 1b  0.8802  0.7986  1.0000   
Model  2  0.4551 0.2146 0.4962 1.0000 
 
Pure Technical Efficiency / Scale Efficiency  
 
  Model 1  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2 
Model 1  1.0000  0.6133 0.9357 0.6148 
Model 1a  0.8926  1.0000  0.7137 0.0263 
Model 1b  0.8403  0.5175  1.0000  0.3958 
Model 2  0.5823  0.3790  0.6892  1.0000 
 
Values in Italics relate to Scale Efficiency.  Values in normal text relate to Pure Technical Efficiency or 
Technical Efficiency as appropriate.  Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: 
(i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items.  Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: 
(i) loans less housing loans, (ii) housing loans (iii) off balance sheet items.  Model 1b: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) 
deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off balance sheet items. 
 
 
Model 2 was drawn from the studies of Avkiran (1999 and 2000), and adopts a revenue focus on bank 
inputs and outputs. This model was found to have low and negative correlations with the other models 
in the DEA study. Model 2 measures the efficiency of banks in turning costs into revenue, while 
Model 1 and its variations measure the efficiency of banks turning quantities of inputs into quantities 
of outputs. The DEA results for Model 2 generally finds the foreign banks to be less efficient than the 
Big Four and Other Domestic banks.
46 This is borne out by comparing the DEA results of this study, 
with those of Avkiran (1999 and 2000), which excluded foreign banks. The average efficiency scores 
in Model 2 are lower than those found by Avkiran (1999 and 2000) for both the DEA and Malmquist 
                                                   
46   In the case of Model 2, the lower scale efficiency of the Big Four banks does not persist across the entire sample period. 
The Malmquist Index results demonstrate that this reflects a catching up effect in scale efficiency. 26 
index studies. However, due to the different sample composition, care should be taken with direct 
comparisons.  
Examination of Models 1, 1a and 1b results in some similar conclusions, in that the Big Four banks 
generally display lower scale efficiency and higher pure technical efficiency (DEA results), 
confirming the barriers to entry discussion presented earlier in this paper. Model 1a, with a retail 
focus, tends to favour the Other Domestic banks, which are also retail focussed. This is consistent with 
the Berger et al (2000) argument of the home field advantage.  
The revenue-focussed model demonstrates the impact of the economic downturn of the early 1990s on 
the foreign banks. The lower DEA efficiency of the foreign banks, as measured in Model 2, also 
demonstrates the impact of the barriers to entry to the Australian market caused by the dominant 
market share of the major banks. Williams (2002) found that the domination of the Australian market 
by the four major banks resulted in a reduction in foreign bank and foreign merchant bank return on 
assets. Lozano-Vivas et al (2001) conclude that adverse environmental conditions can act as a barrier 
to entry to foreign banks. However, the Malmquist results for Model 2 found no substantial 
differences in efficiency between the three bank types considered in this study. 
The differences between Model 1 and its variations and Model 2 for the DEA estimation also indicate 
that while the foreign banks were more efficient in transforming quantities of inputs into quantities of 
outputs than domestic banks, this was not reflected in revenue efficiency. This is consistent with the 
cross-border study of Claessens et al (2001), which found foreign banks are less profitable than 
domestic banks in developed nations. Claessens et al (2001) argued that foreign bank entry is 
associated with increased efficiency of the domestic banking system, as reflected in lower profits of 
domestic banks.
47 In the case of this study, the DEA results for the revenue-focussed Model 2 also 
reflects the impact of foreign banks earning lower profits due to barriers to entry presented by the 
incumbent banks, as well as the economic slowdown of the early 1990s. DeYoung and Nolle (1996) 
found foreign banks were willing to accept lower profits (hence the lower revenue efficiency found in 
Model 2) in return for growth, (this higher growth is potentially reflected in the superior efficiency 
found in Model 1).  Williams (2002) found that the barrier to entry resulting from the domination of 
the Australian market by the Big Four banks resulted in lower foreign bank and foreign merchant bank 
profits in Australia. 
Sathye (2001, p 622) employed a series of subsidiary regressions to determine if the estimated 
efficiency scores were related to variables such as bank size, foreign ownership and cost per 
employee. As discussed by Coelli et al (1998, p 171), if the variables used as inputs and outputs are 
highly correlated with the variables used in the second stage regressions, then any results from second 
stage regressions are potentially biased. Examination of the correlation between inputs and outputs 
used in this study with the variables available for a second stage regression revealed high correlations 
in the order of 0.75 to 0.95. As a result second stage regressions are inappropriate for this study. 
                                                   
47  It is worth noting that the Malmquist Index results found a reduction in efficiency for the revenue focussed Model 2 for 
all banks. This could reflect the arguments of Claessens et al (2001). However, sample size constraints prevent a 
definitive statistical test. 27 
6. Conclusions and directions for further research. 
This study has found average Australian bank DEA efficiency is higher than that found by Sathye 
(2001), but consistent with average efficiency found by Allen and Rai (1996) and Avkiran (1999). In 
contrast to Allen and Rai (1996), our DEA results show that scale inefficiency dominates technical 
inefficiency in the Australian case. The explanation for this difference can be found in the behaviour 
of the Big Four Australian banks during and after deregulation. The major Australian banks used size 
as a barrier to entry via mergers before the entry of the foreign banks and increased spending upon 
branch networks (Stearn and Tress, 1983; Hall, 1987; Ferguson, 1990). Williams (2002) finds that this 
barrier to entry effect resulted in lower foreign bank and foreign merchant bank profits.  Lozano-Vivas 
et al (2001) conclude that negative environmental factors increase the barriers to entry for foreign 
banks. Our Malmquist Index results show that bank efficiency improved, on average, post-
deregulation, with the exception of the revenue-focussed Model 2. The main source of efficiency gains 
post-deregulation was technological change rather than technical efficiency. 
Foreign banks in Australia demonstrated superior scale efficiency, which resulted in increased 
efficiency, on average, compared to the Big Four banks or the Other Domestic Banks. This finding of 
higher foreign bank efficiency is opposite to that found in other studies surveyed by Berger et al 
(2000). This is most likely due to the rationing process during deregulation selecting banks possessing 
attributes consistent with the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis (Berger et al, 2000). An 
interesting direction for further research would be to determine which foreign bank attributes result in 
superior efficiency in the host nation. We also suggest that those foreign banks that elected to not 
convert to branch status, when the opportunity arose, are the most efficient of the foreign banks. The 
process of conversion to branch status seems to explain the reduction in efficiency changes observed 
in 1994 for the foreign banks. Again, further research into this issue would be valuable. Some 
improvement in scale efficiency after the recession of the early 1990s was also found. It is not clear if 
this scale efficiency improvement is due to the exogenous shock of the recession resulting in increased 
attention upon scale efficiency, or if this was due to the post-recession consolidation of the banking 
system. 
We conclude that bank efficiency improved post-deregulation, which confirms the results of Avkiran 
(2000). However, the sample used by Avkiran (2000) excluded foreign banks. Furthermore, those 
banks with a stronger retail focus were less affected by the losses of the early 1990s in terms of 
reduced efficiency. Diversity in the types of banks participating in the banking system was found to be 
an important a source of competitive improvements in efficiency. Consistent with Berger et al (1993), 
conclusions regarding efficiency were found to be sensitive to the specification of inputs and outputs. 
In many cases the choice of inputs and outputs is driven by data availability considerations. However, 
this study indicates that foreign banks were more efficient than domestic banks, on average, post-
deregulation, but this higher efficiency was not found to imply higher foreign bank profits.  
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Appendix 
 
 Table A1 
Sample Characteristics of Model 1a: DEA 
 
Year Big  4  Other  Domestic  Foreign  Total 
1988  2 1 3 6 
1989 3  3  12  18 
1990 3  7  13  23 
1991 4  9  13  26 
1992 4  9  12  25 
1993 4  9  11  24 
1994  4 10 11 25 
1995 4  10  9  23 
1996 4  10  6  20 
1997  4 7 6  17 
1998  4 5 4  13 
1999  4 5 4  13 
2000  4 4 2  10 
2001  4 5 1  10 
Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans less housing loans, (ii) 
housing loans (iii) off balance sheet items. 
 
Table A2 
Sample Characteristics of Model 1b: DEA 
 
Year Big  4  Other  Domestic  Foreign  Total 
1988 2  3  13  18 
1989 3  8  15  26 
1990 3  7  13  23 
1991 4  9  13  26 
1992 4  9  12  25 
1993 4  9  11  24 
1994  4 10 11 25 
1995 4  10  9  23 
1996 4  10  6  20 
1997  4 7 6  17 
1998  4 5 4  13 
1999  4 5 4  13 
2000  4 4 2  10 
2001  4 5 1  10 
Model 1b Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off 




Sample Characteristics of Model 2: DEA 
 
Year Big  4  Other  Domestic  Foreign  Total 
1988  4 8 7  19 
1989  4 9 8  21 
1990  4 9 7  20 
1991 4  10  7  21 
1992 4  10  7  21 
1993 4  12  7  23 
1994 4  10  7  21 
1995 4  11  5  20 2 
1996 4  11  5  20 
1997  4 8 4  16 
1998  4 9 5  18 
1999  4 7 5  16 
2000  4 8 4  16 
2001  4 8 1  13 





Average DEA Efficiency Scores: Model 1a. 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Year       Year     
1988 TE  PTE Scale   1989 TE  PTE Scale 
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1992 TE  PTE Scale   1993 TE  PTE Scale 
















































            
1994 TE  PTE Scale   1995 TE  PTE Scale 
















































           
1996 TE  PTE Scale   1997 TE  PTE Scale 
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1998 TE  PTE Scale   1999 TE  PTE Scale 
















































             
2000 TE  PTE Scale   2001 TE  PTE Scale 
















































Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans less housing loans, (ii) housing loans (iii) 
off balance sheet items. 
TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale: Scale Efficiency.  ODOM: Other Domestic. Values in bold 
are the largest for that category in that year. * Indicates maximum value of 1 for that category. 
Scale Efficiency is calculated as decreasing return to scale; scale efficiency score unchanged; constant returns to scale score 
unchanged; increasing returns to scale, score transformed to (2- original score).  Thus, an average scale efficiency score 
above 1 indicates increasing returns to scale on average, below one indicates decreasing returns to scale on average and a 




Average DEA Efficiency Scores: Model 1b. 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Year       Year     
1988 TE  PTE Scale   1989 TE  PTE Scale 
















































            
1990 TE  PTE Scale   1991 TE  PTE Scale 
















































            
1992 TE  PTE Scale   1993 TE  PTE Scale 
















































            
1994 TE  PTE Scale   1995 TE  PTE Scale 4 
















































           
1996 TE  PTE Scale   1997 TE  PTE Scale 
















































            
1998 TE  PTE Scale   1999 TE  PTE Scale 
















































             
2000 TE  PTE Scale   2001 TE  PTE Scale 
















































Model 1b Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs. (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off balance sheet 
items.  TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale: Scale Efficiency. 
Values in bold are the largest for that category in that year. * Indicates maximum value of 1 for that category. 
Scale Efficiency is calculated as decreasing return to scale; scale efficiency score unchanged; constant returns to scale score 
unchanged; increasing returns to scale, score transformed to (2- original score).  Thus, an average scale efficiency score 
above 1 indicates increasing returns to scale on average, below one indicates decreasing returns to scale on average and a 




Average DEA Efficiency Scores: Model 2. 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Year       Year     
1988 TE  PTE Scale   1989 TE  PTE Scale 
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1992 TE  PTE Scale   1993 TE  PTE Scale 
















































            
1994 TE  PTE Scale   1995 TE  PTE Scale 
















































           
1996 TE  PTE Scale   1997 TE  PTE Scale 
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2000 TE  PTE Scale   2001 TE  PTE Scale 
















































Model 2: Inputs: (i) interest expenses, (ii) non-interest expenses.  Outputs: (i) net interest income, (ii) non-interest income.  
TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale: Scale Efficiency. 
Values in bold are the largest for that category in that year. * Indicates maximum value of 1 for that category. 
Scale Efficiency is calculated as decreasing return to scale; scale efficiency score unchanged; constant returns to scale score 
unchanged; increasing returns to scale, score transformed to (2- original score).  Thus, an average scale efficiency score 
above 1 indicates increasing returns to scale on average, below one indicates decreasing returns to scale on average and a 




DEA Scale Efficiency: Model 1a. 
 
Year       Year     
1988 DRS IRS  CRS   1989 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  2 0 4    All  8 3 7 
Big 4  2 0 0    Big 4  3 0 0 
ODOM  0 0 1    ODOM  1 1 1 
Foreign  0 0 3    Foreign  4 2 6 
            
1990 DRS IRS  CRS   1991 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  6 5  12    All  12 5 9 
Big 4  3 0 0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  1 1 5    ODOM  7 0 2 
Foreign  2 4 7    Foreign  1 5 7 
            
1992 DRS IRS  CRS   1993 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  6 6  13    All  9 6 9 
Big 4  2 0 2    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  3 1 5    ODOM  4 2 3 
Foreign  1 5 6    Foreign  1 4 6 
            
1994 DRS IRS  CRS   1995 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  12 2  11    All  10 2  11 
Big 4  4 0 0    Big 4  3 0 1 
ODOM  4 1 5    ODOM  5 1 4 
Foreign  4 1 6    Foreign  2 1 6 
           
1996 DRS IRS  CRS   1997 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  8 4 8    All  8 4 5 
Big 4  3 0 1    Big 4  3 0 1 
ODOM  4 3 3    ODOM  3 3 1 
Foreign  1 1 4    Foreign  2 1 3 
            
1998 DRS IRS  CRS   1999 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  4 3 6    All  4 3 6 
Big 4  3 0 1    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  1 2 2    ODOM  2 2 1 
Foreign  0 1 3    Foreign  0 1 3 
            
2000 DRS IRS  CRS   2001 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  3 0 7    All  3 1 6 
Big 4  2 0 2    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  1 0 3    ODOM  1 1 3 
Foreign  0 0 2    Foreign  0 0 1 
DRS: Decreasing Returns to Scale; IRS: Increasing Returns to Scale; CRS: Constant Returns to Scale. 
Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans less housing loans, (ii) 




DEA Scale Efficiency: Model 1b. 
 
Year         Year     
1988 DRS IRS  CRS   1989 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  7 2  9    All  9 6  11 
Big 4  2 0  0    Big 4  3 0 0 
ODOM  0 1  2    ODOM  3 3 2 7 
Foreign  5 1  7    Foreign  3 3 9 
            
1990 DRS IRS  CRS   1991 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  9 4 10    All  11 6 9 
Big 4  3 0  0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  3 2  2    ODOM  4 2 3 
Foreign  3 2  8    Foreign  3 4 6 
            
1992 DRS IRS  CRS   1993 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  14 4  7    All  11 4 9 
Big 4  4 0  0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  7 1  1    ODOM  5 1 3 
Foreign  3 3  6    Foreign  2 3 6 
            
1994 DRS IRS  CRS   1995 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  10 5 10    All  13 2 8 
Big 4  4 0  0    Big 4  3 0 1 
ODOM  5 3  2    ODOM  8 1 1 
Foreign  1 2  8    Foreign  2 1 6 
           
1996 DRS IRS  CRS   1997 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  8 6  6    All  7 5 5 
Big 4  4 0  0    Big 4  3 0 1 
ODOM  4 5  1    ODOM  3 4 0 
Foreign  0 1  5    Foreign  1 1 4 
            
1998 DRS IRS  CRS   1999 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  5 4  4    All  5 2 6 
Big 4  3 0  1    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  2 2  1    ODOM  1 1 3 
Foreign  0 2  2    Foreign  0 1 3 
              
2000 DRS IRS  CRS   2001 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  4 0  6    All  3  1  6 
Big 4  3 0  1    Big 4  2  0  2 
ODOM  1 0  3    ODOM  1  1  3 
Foreign  0 0  2    Foreign  0  0  1 
DRS: Decreasing Returns to Scale; IRS: Increasing Returns to Scale; CRS: Constant Returns to Scale. 
Model 1b Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off 




DEA Scale Efficiency: Model 2. 
 
Year       Year     
1988 DRS IRS  CRS   1989 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  10 4 5    All  8 8 5 
Big 4  4 0 0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  5 0 3    ODOM  4 2 3 
Foreign  1 4 2    Foreign  0 6 2 
            
1990 DRS IRS  CRS   1991 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  10 6 4    All  13 4 4 
Big 4  3 0 1    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  7 0 2    ODOM  6 1 3 
Foreign  0 6 1    Foreign  3 3 1 
            8 
1992 DRS IRS  CRS   1993 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  10 6 5    All  14 6 3 
Big 4  4 0 0    Big 4  4 0 0 
ODOM  5 2 3    ODOM  9 2 1 
Foreign  1 4 2    Foreign  1 4 2 
            
1994 DRS IRS  CRS   1995 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  6 12  3    All  5 9 6 
Big 4  3 0 1    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  2 7 1    ODOM  3 6 2 
Foreign  1 5 1    Foreign  0 3 2 
           
1996 DRS IRS  CRS   1997 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  7 5 8    All  3 5 8 
Big 4  2 0 2    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  4 5 2    ODOM  0 4 4 
Foreign  1 0 4    Foreign  1 1 2 
            
1998 DRS IRS  CRS   1999 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  4 7 7    All  4 6 6 
Big 4  2 0 2    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  0 5 4    ODOM  1 3 3 
Foreign  2 2 1    Foreign  1 3 1 
            
2000 DRS IRS  CRS   2001 DRS IRS  CRS 
All  5 5 6    All  8 0 5 
Big 4  1 0 3    Big 4  2 0 2 
ODOM  3 2 3    ODOM  5 0 3 
Foreign  1 3 0    Foreign  1 0 0 
DRS: Decreasing Returns to Scale; IRS: Increasing Returns to Scale; CRS: Constant Returns to Scale. 





Malmquist Indices by Year. Model 1. 
 
   Effch TechCh  Pech  Sech  TfpCh 




































































































































 Foreign  1.03  0.86  1.00  1.03  0.89 9 
(Std  Dev)  (0.19) (0.27) (0.13) (0.08) (0.38) 
















































































































































Model 1: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) off balance sheet items.Effch: 
technical efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale technology.  Techch: technological change.  Pech: pure 
technical efficiency change relative to variable returns to scale technology.  Sech: scale efficiency change.  Tfpch: total factor 




Malmquist Indices by Year. Model 1a. 
 
   Effch TechCh  Pech  Sech  TfpCh 




















































































































































































  Foreign  0.92 0.57 0.91 1.01 0.52 10 
(Std  Dev)  (0.20) (0.10) (0.19) (0.03) (0.15) 
















































Model 1a: Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans less housing loans, (ii) housing loans (iii) 
off balance sheet items. 
Effch: technical efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale technology.  Techch: technological change.  Pech: pure 
technical efficiency change relative to variable returns to scale technology.  Sech: scale efficiency change.  Tfpch: total factor 





Malmquist Indices by Year. Model 1b. 
 
   Effch TechCh  Pech  Sech  TfpCh 








































































































































































































































































  Other  Domestic  0.97 1.00 1.01 0.95 0.96 11 













Model 1b Inputs: (i) employees, (ii) deposits, (iii) equity capital.  Outputs: (i) loans, (ii) investments, (iii) off balance sheet 
items. 
Effch: technical efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale technology.  Techch: technological change.  Pech: pure 
technical efficiency change relative to variable returns to scale technology.  Sech: scale efficiency change.  Tfpch: total factor 




Malmquist Indices by Year. Model 2. 
 
   Effch TechCh  Pech  Sech  TfpCh 
































































































































































































































































































Model 2: Inputs: (i) interest expenses, (ii) non-interest expenses.  Outputs: (i) net interest income, (ii) non-interest income. 
Effch: technical efficiency change relative to constant returns to scale technology.  Techch: technological change.  Pech: pure 
technical efficiency change relative to variable returns to scale technology.  Sech: scale efficiency change.  Tfpch: total factor 
productivity change.  Effch = Pech * Sech.  Tfpch = Effch * Techch.  (There are some small differences due to rounding.)     CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
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